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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
: Case No. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
: Court of Appeals 940060-CA 
vs. : District Court 921400519 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellemt. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
The State, in its brief, argues that the evidence at trial 
establishes each of the elements of the offense of depraved 
indifference murder sufficiently to exclude reasonable doubt. The 
elements of depraved indifference murder under § 76-5-203(1) (c), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, are as follows: (1) that 
the Defendant engaged in conduct which created a graved risk of 
death to another and that conduct resulted in the death of another; 
(2) the Defendant knew that his conduct or the circumstances 
surrounding his conduct created a grave risk of death to another; 
(3) the Defendant acted under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life. (Brief of Appellee, p.16-17) State v. 
Standiforfl, 769 p.2d 254 (Utah 1988); state v. Bolsinger, 698 p.2d 
1214 (Utah 1985) . 
As to the first element, the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish that the Defendant engaged in any 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another. The 
evidence was clear that the child suffered a skull fracture as well 
as severed interspinous ligaments but that neither injury was the 
actual cause of death. That was the testimony of Dr. Richard Boyer 
at Tr. V. 3, at 1270, lines 7 through 14. 
There was no evidence that this Defendant had ever engaged in 
any conduct which would produce a skull fracture or the back 
injury. The only evidence involving the child's head was a slap on 
top of the head which was insufficient to cause any injury. (Tr. 
V. 2, at 1037, 1044; V. 4, at 1414, 1416). The only evidence 
involving the back was the Defendant's practice of holding the 
infant in the fetal position in a manner which was insufficient to 
cause injury. Indeed, no injuries from either practice were ever 
reported and neither practice would be sufficient to cause injury 
without a great deal of additional force or trauma. (Tr. V. 3, at 
1272-1273). 
There was no evidence at all that any conduct engaged in by 
this Defendant actually created a grave risk of death. Again, the 
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evidence was that some additional force or different conduct would 
be necessary to create any risk or injury at all, certainly to 
create a grave risk of death. (Tr. V. 3, at 1272-1273). Neither 
the State nor the jury is entitled to rely on the fact of death to 
establish that any conduct by this Defendant created a grave risk 
of death. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993); State V, 
Tannerf 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). The evidence must be substantial 
and sufficient to establish that this Defendant's conduct actually 
created a grave risk of death and actually caused the death of this 
child. The evidence in this case totally fails in that regard. 
The second element requires proof that the Defendant knew that 
his conduct or the surrounding circumstances created a grave risk 
of death. In other words, even if a grave risk of death was 
actually created, the evidence must, in addition, establish that 
this Defendant knew that such a risk was created by the conduct and 
chose to engage in that conduct anyway. 
There is no evidence of the Defendant's knowledge of the 
existence of a grave risk of death because there is no evidence of 
any conduct on his part which created the risk in the first place. 
The State relied heavily on the practice of the Defendant of 
holding the child in the fetal position in a manner which was 
considered improper by Rona Harding. The evidence was 
uncontroverted, however, that such conduct would not, in and of 
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itself, create a grave risk of death without additional force or 
without some different conduct, none of which was ever observed 
relative to this Defendant. Even Mrs. Hardingfs testimony was thsjt 
she never observed this Defendant to engage in conduct which she 
thought was for the purpose of hurting this child. (Tr. V. 2, at 
1105-1106, 1111-1112). Indeed, the nature of the argument between 
the Defendant and Rona Harding was that Mrs. Harding felt that 
there was some chance of harm to the child and the Defendant felt 
that his conduct posed no danger to the child at all. Mrs. 
Harding's testimony was that because of that difference of opinion 
she and the Defendant argued frequently about various medical 
issues. (Tr. V. 2, at 1111, lines 2-15). 
The State, in its brief, falls into the same evidentiary trap 
as did the trial court in this case by drawing inference that the 
Defendant knew that a grave risk of death was created from the fact 
that the child, did in fact, die. That analysis is reverse in its 
nature in the sense that because there is a death, the conduct 
causing that death must have created a grave risk of death and the 
actor must have known as much. For the evidence to be sufficient 
as a matter of law that the risk was created and that the Defendant 
knew of the risk, there must be evidence of what that conduct was 
and what the circumstances were surrounding the conduct so that an 
inference may be justified concluding that the risk was created and 
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known by the Defendant, State v. Workmanr 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1993); State v. Tannerf 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). There was no 
evidence at this trial from which the jury could reasonably 
conclude that this Defendant knew that his conduct created a grave 
risk of death. 
The third element of this offense requires proof that the 
Defendant's conduct evidenced depraved indifference to human life. 
While this analysis is similar to the element of knowledge of a 
grave risk of death, it differs in that this element includes the 
actus reus or the nature and extent of the conduct. State v. 
Standifordr 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988); State v. Bolsinger, 698 P.2d 
1214 (Utah 1985). Once again, the evidence at trial failed as a 
matter of law to establish that this Defendant's conduct fit the 
legal requirement of depraved indifference. 
The State, in its brief at page 22, relies on the fact of 
death and the nature of the injuries to infer the presence of 
depraved indifference. In other words the State engages in an 
injury based analysis of depraved indifference. The element of 
depraved indifference, however, requires a conduct based analysis, 
or in other words, requires evidence of the nature and extent of 
the conduct, not necessarily the injuries. There was no evidence 
of what conduct by this Defendant could have caused this child's 
injuries or her death, other than mere speculation that he could 
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have extended his prior conduct to include much greater force or 
greatly increased pressure on this child without any evidence that 
he did so. The defense contends that such a leap crosses the 
boundary from justifiable inferences to rampant speculation. 
The Defendant presented alternative theories, based on 
evidence, which were inconsistent with the guilt of the Defendant. 
Unless the evidence is sufficient to exclude those alternate 
theories and so to exclude reasonable doubt, the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law to uphold a verdict of guilty. 
State Vt GallegPS, 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993); State Vt 
Worthenf 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). The evidence that Christy 
Barney had equal access to the child, even more access to the child 
inasmuch as she was alone with the child for three hours after the 
Defendant left for work at 5:30 a.m. on the morning the child was 
hospitalized, and that Ms. Barney was more likely to have injured 
the child and caused her death, create reasonable doubt as a matter 
of law. Even the testimony of Ms. Barney was that if anyone hurt 
this child, it was her, not this Defendant. (Tr. V. 6, at 1807; 
Tr. V. 5, at 1647-1648; V. 5, at 1650; Tr. V. 5, at 1656-1660; V. 
4, at 1497; Tr. V. 2, at 1020). This verdict is based on 
speculation and conjecture and is, indeed, "so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
$ 
a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty." State v. Gallegosr 
851 P.2d 1185# 1190 (Utah App. 1993). 
II 
THE ISSUE OF TEE ADEQUACY OF THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
INSTRUCTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
The State argues in its brief that the Defendant waived any 
objection to the instruction given by the Court defining depraved 
indifference as an element of the offense of depraved indifference 
homicide. (State's brief at p. 24) The basis for this assertion 
is that in a written objection to the requested instruction counsel 
for the Defendant stated that the requested instruction was a 
"correct statement of the law, but the Defendant has submitted a 
modified requested instruction D4a which is a correct statement of 
the law and more accurately and adequately defines the term 
•depraved indifference1 according to current rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court." (Tr. at 423) All of this language was in the 
context of a written objection to the instructions D4 and D4a 
requested by the State. When the trial judge presented the 
instruction in the form as he intended to give it in the charge to 
the jury, no opportunity was afforded to the Defendant to argue the 
objection. Defendant's trial counsel indicated that the Defendant 
still objected to the instruction but no opportunity was afforded 
to restate the objection nor to argue it. 
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Against this factual background, the Statefs argument that no 
objection was stated to the trial court nor preserved for appeal as 
to Instruction No. 4 is without merit. Indeed, a statement that a 
requested instruction is a "correct statement of the law" but still 
inadequate, inaccurate or incomplete and that the Defendant has 
submitted an alternate request which "more accurately and 
adequately" meets the legal requirements for sufficiency can hardly 
be said to waive any objection on the instruction. The Defendant 
has now, quite candidly, submitted on this appeal that neither the 
request by the State nor the request by the Defendant nor the 
instruction as given by the Court rise to the level of sufficiency 
in accordance with the prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court. 
That assertion, however, does not imply waiver or invitation to 
error. 
Even if this Court finds that the Defendant's statement of 
objection to the trial court lacks sufficiency by failing to state 
"distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection", (State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1991)) 
Instruction No. 4 as given by the trial court constitutes "plain 
error" and "exceptional circumstances" resulting in "manifest 
injustice" so to required this Court to review the matter on 
appeal. 
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Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that this 
Court may take into consideration "plain error11 that affects the 
••substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not 
brought tc the attention of the Court. State v. Brownr No. 900148 
(Utah 1992); State v. Eldredgef 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). The 
standard in finding plain error requires that first, the error be 
plain, i.e. the record must indicate that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. Second, 
the error must affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e. 
that the error is harmful. State v. Eldredgef 773 P.2d 29, 36 
(Utah 1989). 
The nature of the elements of depraved indifference homicide 
make it clear and obvious that a clear and correct definition of 
the terms used in those elements is essential to a jury which is 
expected to understand exactly what conduct meets the definition of 
those elements. Instruction No. 4 completely fails in that regard 
as pointed out in the initial Brief of Appellant in this case. It 
is the trial judge's duty to properly instruct the jury and to 
correct errors in instructions requested by counsel before giving 
the charge to the jury. State v. Jonesf No. 890297 (Utah 1991). 
Indeed, Instruction No. 4 is much more than a general 
instruction to the jury as to their duty. Instruction No. 4, while 
it is not the actual elements instruction setting out the various 
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elements of the offense, it is a part and parcel of the elements 
instruction because it gives the definitions of terminology used in 
the elements instruction. Because Instruction No. 4 fails to 
properly or adequately define the terminology of the elements of 
depraved indifference homicide, this jury was left to speculate as 
to the meaning of those elements. In this case, the jury was left 
to wonder what the difference was between depraved indifference and 
reckless conduct. The Defense contends that it was precisely this 
failure in the instructions which allowed this jury to reach its 
verdict of guilty on the questionable evidence in this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it is plain 
error for a trial court to fail to give "an accurate instruction 
upon the basic elements of an offense". State v. Jonesr No. 890297 
(Utah 1991). Failure to do so constitutes reversible error, which 
error can never be harmless. id. The instruction must instruct 
the jury with respect to all the legal elements that it must find 
to convict of the crime charged. id. 
The contention of the Defense is that a complete failure to 
properly instruct as to the definitions of the words or the phrases 
used in the elements instruction is tantamount to a complete 
failure to instruct on the elements in the first instance. That is 
especially true in a case such as this where the legal theory of 
depraved indifference is obscure even to the trained legal mind. 
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State V. Standi ford, 769 P.2d 254, 263 (Utah 1988). The 
difference, if such exists, between a "substantial and 
unjustifiable risk" of death (manslaughter) and a "grave risk of 
death" (depraved murder) has been said to be not meaningful. Id. 
A lack of definition of these legal terms leaves the jury without 
necessary guidance to determine whether the facts in the case 
presented meet the necessary definitions or elements of the offense 
charged. 
Finally, this is not a case where trial counsel merely 
remained silent on the offending instruction (State v. Medina, 738 
P. 2d 1021 (Utah 1987)) or where the Defendant requested the 
instruction of the trial Court (State v. Perduer 813 P. 2d 1201 
(Utah 1991)). Defendant's trial counsel objected in writing to the 
requested instruction on the grounds that it failed to adequately 
define the elements terminology and that "Defendant has submitted 
a modified requested instruction D4a which is a correct statement 
of the law and more accurately and adequately defines the term 
'depraved indifference1 according to current rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court." (Tr. at 423) While the objection as stated to the 
trial Court may have not included all of the arguments advanced on 
appeal, the objection and the grounds stated therefor were 
certainly adequate to notify the trial judge that the Defendant 
contended that the instruction as given was improper and that other 
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instructions were necessary to so instruct the jury and why. This 
issue is properly before this Court on appeal. 
Ill 
THE ISSUE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH DEPRAVED MURDER 
STATUTE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
The State argues that the Defendants constitutionality 
argument pertaining to Section 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended is improper on appeal inasmuch as it was not raised 
below. The Defense, however, contends that the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face and that its application to this 
Defendant was plain error and that specieil circumstances are 
present which mandate consideration of this issue on appeal to 
prevent manifest injustice. 
The plain error exception is governed by State v. Eldredge, 
supra. The analysis which pertains to finding plain error is 
discussed fully in Point II above and the same analysis applies in 
the case of the constitutional issue. The Defendant contends that 
plain error exists because the statute is unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied to this Defendant and the Court of Appeals 
should so find. 
"Exceptional circumstances" is a term which "is broad and 
remains somewhat undefined". State v. Archambeauf 820 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1991). One factor to be considered in determining whether 
exceptional circumstances exist is whether the Defendant's liberty 
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is at stake. State v. Archambeau. supra.; State V» Breckenriflge, 
688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983); State V, Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1990). In this case, it certainly is. Other factors have not been 
clearly defined for exceptional circumstances. The Defendant 
contends that exceptional circumstances exist in this case in that 
the statute in question is unconstitutional on its face and as 
applied. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty in 
delineating how the elements of depraved murder differ from 
manslaughter. The time has come to declare the legal fiction of 
depraved indifference unconstitutional and this case presents the 
best example why that is the correct result. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Defendant-Appellant submits that this Court 
should find that the evidence below was insufficient to support the 
verdict of guilty and this case should be remanded with 
instructions to enter a dismissal. In the alternative, this Court 
should find that the Utah Depraved Murder statute is 
unconstitutional and reverse this judgment. In the alternative, 
this Court should find that the Defendant was deprived of a fair 
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trial on the remaining grounds on appeal and should remand for a 
new trial. 
Submitted this U r— day of February, 1995. 
JMSES G. CLARK 
.Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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